The minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) is widely believed to save lives by reducing traffic fatalities among underage drivers. Further, the Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act, which pressured all states to adopt an MLDA of 21, is regarded as having contributed enormously to this life saving effect. This paper challenges both claims. State-level panel data for the past 30 years show that any nationwide impact of the MLDA is driven by states that increased their MLDA prior to any inducement from the federal government. Even in early adopting states, the impact of the MLDA did not persist much past the year of adoption. The MLDA appears to have only a minor impact on teen drinking. 
Introduction
The Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act (FUDAA), signed by President Ronald Reagan on July 17, 1984, threatened to withhold highway construction funds from states that failed to increase their minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) to 21 by October 1, 1986. Some states complied without protest, but many states balked and sued the federal government to prevent implementation of the Act. In South Dakota v. Dole (1987) , however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the Act constitutional. The Court decided that the "relatively small financial inducement offered by Congress" was not so coercive "as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion." The Court argued, in particular, that reducing traffic fatalities among 18-20 year olds was sufficient reason for the federal government to intervene in an arena traditionally reserved to states. We challenge the view that MLDAs reduce traffic fatalities, based on three findings.
First, the overall impact estimated in earlier research is driven by states that increased their MLDA prior to any inducement from the federal government. Second, even in early adopting 1 In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor expressed skepticism that a uniform drinking age of 21 across the United States would have the "life-saving' effects that might justify federal encroachment on rights afforded to states under the 10 th Amendment to the Constitution (South Dakota v. Dole, 1987) . The 10 th Amendment states, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. At least one of the authors believes that, even if the MLDA saves lives, the FUDAA is not constitutional.
states, the impact of the MLDA did not persist much past the year of adoption. Third, the MLDA has at most a minor impact on teen drinking.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the history of the MLDA and reviews the pre-existing literature. Section 3 examines the aggregate trends in the key variables. Section 4 describes the state-level data set and presents panel estimates of the relation between the MLDA and traffic fatalities. Section 5 investigates the effects of the MLDA on teen drinking.
Historical Background and Prior Literature
When the United States repealed Alcohol Prohibition in 1933, the 21 st Amendment left states free to legalize, regulate, or prohibit alcohol as they saw fit. Most legalized but also enacted substantial regulation. This new regulation typically included an MLDA. logic that a person old enough to die for America is old enough to drink (Asch and Levy 1987, Mosher 1980) . Whatever the reasons, the lower MLDAs "enfranchised" over five million 18-20 year olds to buy alcohol (Males 1986, p. 183) .
Soon after the reductions in the MLDAs, empirical studies claimed that traffic collisions and fatalities were increasing in states that lowered their MLDA. Most prominently featured in congressional discussion were two comprehensive, multi-state studies on the "life-saving" effects of raising the MLDA-the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) study and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) study. According to Males (1986) , both studies were referred to more than 50 times in the House and Senate debates, "almost to the exclusion of other research on the question" (p. 182). 3 These research findings played a key role in reversing the trend toward lower MLDAs. The justification for the FUDAA, espoused by organizations like the Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, the American Medical Association, and the National Safety Council, was that higher MLDAs resulted in fewer traffic fatalities among 18-20 year olds (Males, 1986) .
After passage of the FUDAA, all states adopted an MLDA21 by the end of 1988. Table 2 gives the most recent date each state switched to an MLDA21. Several states were early adopters (Michigan, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey), increasing their MLDAs before passage of the FUDAA. Other states were less eager to change. Colorado, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia passed MLDA21 legislation, for example, but each provided for repeal if the FUDAA were held unconstitutional (DISCUS, 1996) . Texas and Kansas enacted "sunset provisions" allowing the MLDA to drop back to 18 once federal sanctions expired (DISCUS, 1996) . When the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the FUDAA, states faced a strong incentive to maintain an MLDA21. Nevertheless, the differences in how states responded suggests a policy endogeneity that needs to be addressed.
Several authors have recently summarized the MLDA literature, so we do not review specific papers in detail (see Shults et al. 2001, Wagenaar and Toomey 2002) . Overall the existing research finds a negative relationship between the MLDA and traffic fatalities, but most studies omit key variables and mainly analyze either cross-sectional data from one year or timeseries data in one state (Ruhm 1996) .
The most important exception to this summary is Dee (1999) (Dee, 1999, p. 314 ). Dee's analysis forms the starting point for the empirical work below.
In addition to considering the impact of the MLDA on traffic fatalities, earlier literature also considers how the MLDA affects teen drinking. 4 Kaestner (2000) explains that most studies use cross-sectional data and fail to control for unmeasured state characteristics affecting both alcohol consumption and minimum drinking ages. Again, Dee (1999) is an exception. Using the same techniques just described, Dee concludes that moving away from an MLDA of 18 is associated with a reduction in heavy teen drinking of 8.4%. More recently, Carpenter et al. (2007) replicate Dee (1999) and extend his sample to include 11 more years of data. 5 They find that "exposure to an MLDA of 18 was associated with a statistically significant increase in drinking participation and heavy drinking of about 4 and 3 percentage points, respectively" (p.
21).
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They acknowledge, however, that adoption of the MLDA21 might have increased underreporting.
An Overview of the Aggregate Data
Before examining state-level regressions that relate traffic fatality rates (TFR) to (Houston et al., 1995) .
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The aggregate data thus provide little confirmation that MLDAs reduce traffic fatalities.
These data also suggest the importance of controlling for pre-existing trends. We address this concern in the analysis that follows.
Data and Results
We next examine the relation between MLDAs and traffic fatalities using state-level panel data. This approach is better targeted than the aggregate approach considered above, since it allows us to compare fatalities within each state to changes in the MLDA in that state.
We measure traffic fatalities using the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS).
FARS contains the characteristics of vehicles, drivers, occupants, and non-occupants involved in all recorded fatal motor vehicle accidents in the United States. Dee (1999) We merge the FARS data with population information from the Census Bureau to construct age-specific vehicular fatality rates. We also include the unemployment rate, real per capita personal income, a binary indicator for whether a state has a mandatory seat belt law, the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit for legal driving, beer taxes, and total vehicle miles traveled. The last variable is a proxy for the vehicle miles traveled by 18-20 year olds, as mileage data are not age-specific. Table 3 presents summary statistics.
We omit several potentially relevant policies, in part to conform with Dee (1999) , in part because of data availability, and in part because previous studies have found limited evidence of any impact on traffic fatality rates. These variables include dram shop liability laws, mandatory sentences for driving under the influence (DUI), sobriety check points, anti-plea bargaining statutes, changes in tort liability laws that place greater responsibility with intoxicated drivers, happy-hour regulations, and alcohol education programs.
Using this data set, we estimate ln(TFR st /(1-TFR st )) = β 1 MLDA st + β 2 Controls st + β 3 (state trend) + u s + v t + e st (1) where β 1 is the point estimate of how MLDA laws influence traffic fatalities, β 2 is a vector of determinants of traffic fatalities, β 3 is the linear trend for each state, u s is a state fixed-effect, v t is a year-effect, and e st is a mean-zero random error. We choose this form for the dependent variable to follow Dee (1999) . We estimate this specification using weighted least squares. If TFR st is the traffic fatality rate, and the regressand is ln(TFR st /(1-TFR st )), then the error term is heteroscedastic, with variance (TFR st (l -TFR st )n st ) -1 , where n st is the age-specific population for the fatality rate (Ruhm 1996 Figure 5 graphs TFR18-20 in several states, along with an indicator for whether the state adopted an MLDA21. In South Carolina, TFR18-20 was increasing rapidly prior to adoption and then began a marked decline, consistent with an effect of the MLDA21 in reducing 18-20 year old fatalities. In California, however, TFR18-20 also declined dramatically even though the MLDA was 21 throughout. In South Dakota and Louisiana, TFR18-20 declined prior to the increase in the MLDA and seems to have decreased at a slower rate after MLDA21 adoption.
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These four graphs, therefore, show a wide range of "impacts" of the MLDA. Plots for all 50
states confirm substantial heterogeneity in MLDA21's effect.
To examine this in more detail, Table 5 presents state-by-state estimates of the effects of the MLDA. Of the 38 states that increased their MLDA over the post 1975 time period, the MLDA21 reduced fatalities in six at the 5% level and in nine at the 10% level. At the same time, however, the MLDA21 increased fatalities in four states at the 5% level and in five at the 10% level. In eleven states the coefficient on MLDA is positive but insignificant while in thirteen it is negative but insignificant.
This heterogeneity suggests Dee's results are driven by a few states in which the impact is sufficiently negative to outweigh the positive or small impact in most states. The question is whether this heterogeneity is just sampling variation or something more systematic. We show below that the overall negative impact results from states that adopted the MLDA21 before 1984-that is, before the FUDAA. These results suggest that, at most, the MLDA21 reduced TFR18-20 in states that adopted on their own. This raises the question of endogeneity. The MLDA21 in these states may have been enacted in response to grassroots concern against drunk driving or implemented 13 No states changed their MLDA to 21 in 1981 or 1982.
14 The MLDA laws were coded such that a year cell has an MLDA21 indicator of 1 if the MLDA of 21 was in effect for at least half that year. As the FUDAA was passed in July, Model (4) includes states that adopted an MLDA21 before its passage. Model (5) differs in including states that adopted an MLDA21 after 1984.
alongside other efforts to reduce traffic fatalities. Relatedly, states that adopted on their own may have been states that devoted significant resources to enforcement.
To address the possible endogeneity of MLDA legislation, we modify the specification of the MLDA variable. Instead of a dummy for years in which it is in effect, we include several binary variables representing an interval of time in relation to the date a state enacted an MLDA21. For example, the binary variable "5-6 Before" is equal to 1 for every state-year that is 5-6 years before a state adopted an MLDA of 21. The other intervals included in the regressions are "3-4 Before," "1-2 Before," "Year of Enactment," "1-2 After," "3-4 After," "5-6 After," "7-8
After," and "9-10 After." This empirical strategy improves on the approach in Section 4 because the time pattern of policy effects informs both the extent of policy endogeneity and the persistence of the policy's effect. Table 7 gives estimates of this alternative specification; figures 6-9 plot the coefficients and standard error bands on the MLDA21 variables. Model (1) supports the claim that the MLDA legislation was not a significant determinant of traffic fatality rates, as none of the coefficients is significant at even the 10% level. The pattern of coefficients mildly suggests that the MLDA reduces TFR18-20, but the pre-adoption coefficients are positive, and the effect approaches zero in the years following enactment.
In Model (2), which includes only the states that adopted their MLDA21 during or prior to 1983, there does seem to be a significant and large drop in fatalities during the year of MLDA increase. Though not significant, this decrease predates the adoption of the MLDA21 across states, as illustrated by the negative coefficients on the binary indicators dating back six years before policy enactment. In the year of adoption, fatalities declined 16.7% at the 5% significance
level. Yet as early as 1-2 years after enactment, the MLDA is no longer significant and the point estimate increases from -16.7% to -5.4%. More interestingly, the MLDA21 seems to increase fatalities from three to six years after enactment, although the result is not significant. This suggests the fatality-reductions due to MLDA21 policies were transient or even perverse.
Model (3) restricts the sample to those states that enacted an MLDA21 during or after 1984. Those states experienced increases in 18-20 year old fatalities leading up to enactment of an MLDA21; upon the adoption, there was no significant decrease in fatalities, and as soon as 1-2 years after adoption the increase in traffic fatalities became significant at the 10% level. As with the early adopters, the coefficient on MLDA21 approaches zero five years beyond adoption.
Model (4) restricts the sample to states that adopted the MLDA21 after 1984. The estimates suggest that 1 to 2 years after adoption, states experienced a 10% increase in 18-20 traffic fatalities, significant at the 1% level. The effect persists at the 10% significance level 3-4 years after the adoption. In these states the traffic fatality rate of 18-20 year olds seems to have been increasing prior to the adoption of the MLDA 21. In states that were pressured to change their MLDAs, the changes were likely inconsequential or even counterproductive.
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Several additional findings are also inconsistent with the claim that the minimum legal drinking age reduces traffic fatalities. Table 8 presents regressions analogous to those in Table 6 , but using the 17 year old driver fatalities as the dependent variable, find that MLDA19, MLDA20, and MLDA21 all increase traffic fatalities at the 5% level of significance. One explanation is that when the MLDA is 18, more high school students have access to alcohol through peer networks, including 18 year olds. When the MLDA is higher, these peer networks are less effective at obtaining alcohol, so individuals younger than 18 feel pressure to drink intensely at each drinking occasion. This lack of consistency reaffirms the tenuous relationship between the MLDA and traffic fatalities.
The MLDA and Teen Alcohol Consumption
The final question we address is why the MLDA does not appear to have had much effect on traffic fatalities. One possibility is that although the MLDA reduces 18-20 year old drinking, it does so mainly for those who drink responsibly. Another possibility is that the MLDA does not reduce drinking to a substantial degree. The previous literature has suggested that the MLDA does reduce teen drinking. We revisit that question here.
We utilize data from Monitoring the Future, an annual survey of high school seniors that contains measures of drinking habits. We employ the two specific measures common in the literature, "drinker" (having any drink of alcohol in the last month), and "heavy episodic drinker"
(having five or more drinks in a row at some point in the last two weeks). We also examine the number of motor vehicle accidents that respondents report as occurring after consuming alcohol.
We estimate regressions similar to those considered above but with these dependent variables.
The measure of the MLDA is identical to that used in previous literature, a dummy for having a drinking age of 18. Tables 10 and Table 11 give results. Though we use slightly different data than Carpenter et al. (2007) , we approximate their findings. Models (1) and (2) in Tables 10 and 11 show an MLDA18 is associated with an almost 4% increase in drinking participation rates, and approximately a 3% increase in heavy episodic drinking rates, both significant at the 1% level.
Model (3) and (4), however, suggest that these reductions derive mainly from states that adopted the MLDA21 before enactment of the FUDAA. 17 Model (3) shows that in the earlyadopting states, the MLDA 18 is associated with a 5% increase in drinking participation and a 3.7% increase in heavy drinking, both significant at the 1% level. In later-adopting states, exposure to an MLDA of 18 has a weaker and insignificant effect on alcohol consumption.
Two interpretations of these results are possible. The absence of any effect of MLDA18 in reducing drinking in the coerced adopters is consistent with the absence of any effect of MLDA21 on traffic fatalities. The negative effects found for early adopters might reflect a true reduction in alcohol consumption and also explain a reduction in fatalities in these states. Yet these negative effects might also reflect an increase in underreporting in the MTF data due to enactment of MLDA21.
One mechanism for resolving this is to examine the number of alcohol-related traffic accidents reported by MTF respondents. If the MLDA works as predicted and underage persons are deterred from drinking, the number of accidents post-alcohol consumption should decline when a state adopts an MLDA21. The results in Table 12 are telling. The panel estimates reveal that movement away from an MLDA of 18 is associated with a statistically insignificant -.0007 change in reporting of alcohol-related traffic accidents. Given these findings, it is not surprising that Higson et al. found that "although the modes of procuring alcohol changed, no significant changes were observed in Massachusetts relative to New York in the proportion of surveyed teenagers who reported that they drank or in the volume of their consumption" (p. 163).
Conclusion
The MLDA21 is predicated on the belief that it reduces alcohol-related teen trafficfatalities. We challenge that claim, showing that the MLDA fails to have the fatality-reducing effects that previous papers have reported.
If not the MLDA, then what might explain the drastic reductions in traffic fatalities over the past half century? Figure 2 suggests that the decline began in the year 1969, the year in which several landmark improvements were made in the accident avoidance and crash protection features of passenger cars. Table 13 , taken from Crandall et al. (1986) shows just how many federal safety standards were introduced in the 1968 model year. They explain that "most of these standards for new automobiles were in place by 1970," which allowed for improvements in over three dozen safety measures not previously found in automobiles (Crandall et all, 1986, p. 47) .
Further research might operationalize these advancements in vehicle safety as they are likely to be major determinants of the declining traffic fatality trends.
The same effort should be made to measure and control for advances in medical technology. In this way, researchers can ascertain whether traffic fatalities are declining because traffic crashes are becoming less frequent or becoming less lethal. Future studies estimating the relationship between the MLDA and traffic fatality rates might use as control variables the number of blood banks, the number of hospital admissions, the number of hospitals that provide open-heart surgery, the number of hospital affiliated physicians, or the number of hospital beds in the state (Harris et al., 2002) .
In arguing against an MLDA of 21, this paper also challenges the desirability of coercive federalism. The case of the drinking age informs several other public policy debates, including the appropriateness of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). When the governor of Utah attempted to ignore NCLB's provisions that conflicted with Utah's own education policy, the Department of Education threatened to withhold federal education funding (Fusarelli, 2005) .
Fusarelli (2005) argues that such actions demonstrate that in just "a few short years, federal education policy had shifted from minimal federal involvement (President Reagan wanted to abolish the U.S. Department of Education) to the development of voluntary national standards (under President Clinton) to the new law mandating testing of all students in Grades 3-8" (p.
121). Whether Congress has violated the 10 th amendment with NCLB is a question left for the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the empirical strategy employed in this paper might tease out whether the successes attributed to the NCLB are similarly driven by states that proactively adopted its standards of education reform prior to the federal mandate.
APPENDIX A: DATA SOURCES
The sources of all the variables used in the reported regressions are listed below.
Fatalities
Data obtained from the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). 
Consumption

Vehicles Miles Traveled
Data obtained from thirty issues of the Federal Highway Administration's annual publication, Highway Statistics.
Per Capita Personal Income Rates Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Beer Tax
Data obtained from the United States Brewers' Association, Brewers Almanac, published annually, 1941-present.
Unemployment Rates
Data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
BAC .08 Laws
Data obtained from several issues of The Insurance Fact Book, published annually by the Insurance Information Institute.
MLDA Laws
Data obtained from Distilled Spirits Council of United States.
Mandatory Seat Belt Laws
Data obtained from several issues of The Insurance Fact Book, published annually by the Insurance Information Institute. (1) and (2) include variables controlling for the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the beer tax rate in the state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. Additionally, Model (3) controls for whether the state has a BAC .08 law and vehicle miles traveled within the state. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates for Models (1) -(3). Standard errors clustered by state are reported for Model (2) and Model (3). Dee's original results were reported with t-statistics instead of standard errors, and are reproduced as such. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of TFR st /(1-TFR st ) where TFR st is the agespecific fatality rate for drivers in state s at time t. The estimations are weighted by n(TFR st )(1-TFR st ) where n is age-specific population in state s at time t. All models include variables controlling for the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the beer tax rate in the state, vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state trends. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% where n is 18-20 year old population in state s at time t. All models include variables controlling for the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the beer tax rate in the state, vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state trends. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Carpenter et al. (2007) includes controls for demographic covariates, including: age, a male indicator, an indicator for Hispanic ethnicity, an indicator for African American race, and an indicator for "other race," as well as levels of the beer tax and presence of Zero Tolerance laws in a state-year. My controls include presence of BAC .08 per se law, state unemployment rates, per capita personal income rates, beer tax rates, and age of respondent. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates for Models (1)-(4). The results in Carpenter et al. (2007) were reported with t-statistics instead of standard errors, and are reproduced as such. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The model includes variables controlling for the age of the respondent, the state unemployment rate, state average per capita personal income, the beer tax rate in the state, vehicle miles traveled within state, the BAC limit for driving in a state, and a binary indicator for any mandatory seat belt law. They also allow for linear state trends. Robust standard errors are reported below point estimates. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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